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report indicated that the pilot program
conducted by a team of deputies in
DRE's Los Angeles office was a success.
Consequently, as of October I, the Critical Path Program was implemented in
both subdivisions offices. From October
I forward, a follow-up notice will be
sent to the developer as well as the
single responsible party when DRE has
not received a response to its deficiency
notice within thirty days in the case of
standard subdivisions, and within sixty
days in the case of common interest
subdivisions.
LITIGATION:
In Davey v. Real Estate Commissioner of the State of California, No.
8037692, 88 D.A.R. 15091 (Dec. 2,
1988), the Second District Court of
Appeal ruled that a victim of a real
estate licensee's fraud could not be
compensated from the Real Estate Recovery Account because the victim failed
to ascertain whether the licensee was
able to satisfy the judgment from his
own funds. The Recovery Account is
available to compensate those who are
defrauded by licensed real estate brokers
and salespersons once they have obtained
a final judgment against the licensee
based on fraud.
Plaintiff's claim was filed pre-1987,
and thus was governed by former Business and Professions Code sections 10471
and I04 72, which required the victim to
make "all reasonable searches and inquiries to ascertain whether the judgment debtor is possessed of real or
personal property or other assets" that
may be used to satisfy the judgment
against the licensee. With respect to
post-1987 claims, the issue appears to
have been resolved by recent statutory
amendment. Section 10471(c)(7)(F),
added in 1987, requires that the claimant represent that the licensee's debt has
not been discharged in bankruptcy or, if
a bankruptcy case is pending, that the
bankruptcy court has already declared
the debt nondischargeable.
Here, the court held that Davey failed
to establish that he had made reasonable
efforts to ascertain whether the licensee
could satisfy the judgment against him.
Although Davey had filed a complaint
in the licensee's bankruptcy case to determine whether the licensee's debt was
dischargeable, the court found that he
did not pursue the matter sufficiently
and did not explain his failure to do so.
The purpose behind the diligence requirement is to conserve the Account's resources by making the fund a last resort
for victims and to protect the interests
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of the DRE as a potential subrogee to
the victim's rights against the licensee.
Attorney General's Opinion. In a
December I Opinion (No. 87-1002, 88
D.A.R. 15253), Attorney General John
Van de Kamp concluded that certain
practices by banks and other lenders in
retaining services of trustees in foreclosure proceedings do not violate Civil
Code section 2924(c) or the Cartwright
Act, but do violate California's Unfair
Business Practices Act.
In his opinion, the Attorney General
explained that when a borrower defaults
on a loan secured by real estate, the
lender often retains the services of a
business specializing in foreclosures,
known as a "foreclosure trustee," to
handle the foreclosure procedures. Foreclosure trustees customarily charge the
maximum fees allowed by Civil Code
section 2924 for their services. However,
because federal regulations limit the
amount the federal government will reimburse the lender for foreclosure trustee
fees on loans insured by the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) or Veterans Administration (VA), lenders typically insist that a foreclosure trustee
limit its fees for handling these loans to
the amount of the reimbursement limitsignificantly lower than the maximum
trustee's fee allowed by state law.
The Attorney General concluded that
the practice of lenders to designate as
foreclosure trustees on defaulted FHA
and VA loans only those who will agree
to charge up to the amount the federal
government will reimburse is an unfair
business practice under Business and
Professions Code section 1700 et seq.,
because it results in third parties paying
higher foreclosure fees than the lender
for the same trustee services, in contravention of public policy. Additional unfairness results in the inevitable impact
the practice has on fees charged for
trustee services in foreclosure of loans
not secured by the FHA or VA. The
pressure to charge higher fees for the
rest of the foreclosure trustee's services
makes the practice unfair to those who
must reimburse the higher fees.
RECENT MEETINGS:
At the October meeting of the Advisory Commission, Assistant Commissioner
(Regulatory) Betty Ludeman reported
on the issue of whether the amount of
personal funds which may be maintained
in a real estate broker's trust account
may be increased to reflect the minimum
deposit required by financial institutions
to waive monthly service fees. Currently,
brokers are allowed to maintain up to

$100 of their own funds in a trust
account. According to 48 major financial
institutions, the median deposit necessary
to waive service fees is $1,000-2,000.
The sole purpose of allowing up to $ IOO
in personal funds to be maintained in a
broker's trust account is to cover bank
service charges, since many banks are
unwilling to charge the broker's commercial account for service charges on the
trust account. The DRE's Audit Division
conducted an investigation and concluded that a maximum of $100 is sufficient
to cover monthly service charges. Ludeman cited several reasons why the $ I 00
limit should not be increased: (I) if a
broker were to maintain a substantial
sum of personal funds in his/her trust
account, it could be argued that the
account is noncustodial and, consequently, the account would be subject to attachment or possibly be frozen during litigation; and (2) the FDIC has held that
funds of various owners which are placed
in a custodial deposit in an insured bank
will be recognized for insurance purposes
to the same extent as if their names and
interests were disclosed on the records
of the bank. Thus, the DRE will not increase the amount of personal funds which
may be maintained in a trust account.
The DRE also addressed the issue
whether employees of telemarketing services must obtain real estate licenses.
Generally, telemarketing service companies contract with a real estate brokerage to make calls to property owners to
inquire as to their interest in selling
their property. If the owner is interested,
then an appointment is made for the
owner to contact a specific licensee.
Because the term "real estate broker" is
defined to include the solicitation of
prospective sellers and purchasers of real
property and the solicitation of listings
of real property, and because the sole
goal of telemarketing is to eventually
effect a sale, DRE has concluded that
telemarketing company personnel using the
telephone to solicit potential buyers and
sellers must be licensed as real estate agents.
FUTURE MEETINGS:
To be announced.

DEPARTMENT OF SAVINGS
AND LOAN
Commissioner: William J. Crav.ford
(415) 557-3666
(213) 736-2798
The Department of Savings and loan
(DSL) is headed by a commissioner who
has "general supervision over all associa-
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REGULATORY AGENCY ACTION
tions, savings and loan holding companies, service corporations, and other persons" (Financial Code section 8050). DSL
holds no regularly scheduled meetings,
except when required by the Administrative Procedure Act. The Savings and
Loan Association Law is in sections 5000
through I 0050 of the California Financial Code. Departmental regulations are
in Title 10, Chapter 2, of the California
Code of Regulations.
MAJOR PROJECTS:

Proposed Delayed Funds Availability
Regulations. On October 12, DSL adopted emergency regulatory changes to
repeal sections 106.200-.205 and adopt
new sections 106.200-.202, Chapter 2,
Title IO of the California Code of Regulations (CCR), in order to comply with
the federal Expedited Funds Availability
Act (Title VI of Public Law 100-86,
enacted on August 10, 1987). The new
federal law shortens the hold period
which a financial institution may place
on checks deposited by customers. (See
CRLR Vol. 8, No. 4 (Fall 1988) pp. 8081 and Vol. 8, No. I (Winter 1988) p. 78
for background information.) The new
regulations require savings institutions
under DSL 's jurisdiction to conform to
all funds availability requirements established by the Federal Reserve Board in
12 C.F.R. Part 229 et seq.
The DSL subsequently noticed its
proposal to permanently adopt the regulatory changes adopted on an emergency
basis on October 12. Written comments
on the proposed changes were accepted
by DSL until December 12.
Proposed Escrow l.Aw Regulations
Effective. DSL's proposed changes to
implement the new authority given to
savings associations to act as escrow
agents were approved by the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL) and became
effective on January 6. The new regulations appear in Chapter 2, Title 10 of
the CCR. (See CRLR Vul. 8, No. 4
(Fall 1988) p. 89 for background information on these regulatory changes.)
Proposed Changes to DSL '.s Public
Information Regulations. DSL adopted
the proposed changes to its regulatory
provisions related to information which
is available to the public (see CRLR
Vol. 8, No. 4 (Fall 1988) pp. 89-90 for
background information). The Department sent the rulemaking file to OAL
on December 6.
FSLIC Deficit Increases. More than
500 savings and loan institutions across
the nation-nearly one-sixth of the country's 3,100 thrifts-are insolvent. In the
1980-87 period, California led the nation
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in savings and loan failures, but in 1988
Texas and Oklahoma overtook California for this dubious honor. The sources
of the problem are numerous, but deregulation is frequently cited as the main
cause. In the early 1980s, Congress enacted laws granting federally-chartered
thrifts broad new powers, eliminating
previous ceilings on interest rates paid
on savings accounts, and giving them the
authority to make commercial, corporate,
and agricultural loans. At the same time,
California and some other states further
deregulated their state-chartered savings
and loans, providing even greater flexibility than allowed by federal laws.
But even as lending and investment
became increasingly unregulated, federal
agencies continued to insure deposits.
The problem became most acute in the
"oil-patch" states of Texas, Oklahoma,
and Louisiana when oil prices began to
fall in the early 1980s: S&Ls which had
made risky investments and loans to
speculative energy deals and real estate
projects began to face default. Dishonest
management in the industry and lax
supervision by government regulators
also contributed to the problem. Government regulators were slow to impose
discipline on failing thrifts, believing
time and growth could enable them to
resolve their problems. This in turn led
savings and loans to make further risky
loans and investments.
Amidst all this speculative activity,
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC) continued to insure S&L deposits. Bank deposits at the
nation's 14,000 banks are protected by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). In the past, the money to
insure deposits by FSLIC and FDIC
has come from premiums paid by insured
savings and loans and premiums paid
by insured banks, not from the federal

government. At the present time, FSLIC
has a deficit of $14 billion and is issuing
promissory notes to bail out insolvent
savings and loans. In contrast, FDIC
has a surplus of $15 billion. Key issues
include the amount by which premiums
paid by member thrifts and banks should
be raised; whether the FSLIC and FDIC
should be merged; and the extent to
which Congress and the taxpayers should
pay to solve the problem.
Because of the disparity in financial
posture between FSLIC and FDIC, the
possibility of a merger has obvious appeal, but is a proposal strenuously opposed
by FDIC. A merger might be justified
on policy grounds because the traditional
distinctions between banks and savings
and loans have become blurred in recent
years. Formerly, thrifts financed home
mortgages, and banks served business
and commercial customers. Today, savings and loans in a deregulated environment may make a wide variety of real
estate loans. Some savings and loans
(e.g., Home Federal Savings and Loan
Association based in San Diego) are
attempting to switch to FDIC. Home
Federal will support proposed state legislation that would allow it to become a
state-chartered "savings bank," and therefore become eligible for FDIC insurance.
Some form of government bailout
seems inevitable, but the extent of taxpayer involvement is a matter of considerable dispute. The Chair of the FDIC
claims that the tab will be greater than
the total of the Marshall Plan after
World War II plus the bailouts of Chrysler Corporation, Lockheed Corporation,
Penn Central Railroad, and New York
City. However, any federal government
support exacerbates the federal deficit
problem and would be exceedingly difficult under the Gramm-Rudman deficit
reduction requirements.

DEPARTMENT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
CAL-OSHA
Director: Ronald T. Rinaldi
(916) 322-3640
California's Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (Cal-OSHA) is
part of the cabinet-level Department of
Industrial Relations (DIR). The agency
administers California's programs ensur-
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ing the safety and health of government
employees at the state and local levels.
Cal-OSHA was created by statute in
October 1973 and its authority is outlined in Labor Code sections 140-49. It is
approved and monitored by, and receives
some funding from, the federal OSHA.
The Occupational Safety and Health
Standards Board (OSB) is a quasi-legis-
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